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Abstract
We analyze a large data set of stock option exercises for a large data set of almost
200,000 option packages for more than 16,000 US top executives and analyze their motiva-
tions for the early exercise of their stock options. We estimate a hazard model to identify
the main variables that inﬂuence executives' timing decisions and ﬁnd that behavioral
factors (e.g., trends in past stock prices), institutional factors (vesting dates, grant dates,
blackout periods) and inside information strongly inﬂuence the timing of stock option
exercises. By contrast, we ﬁnd little support for the inﬂuence of variables proposed by
utility-based models.
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1 Introduction
Stock option exercise behavior by top executives as well as non-executive employees has been
widely studied in the literature, empirically and theoretically. However, there seems to be no
consensus on the main drivers that inﬂuence stock option exercise behavior. For well diversiﬁed
investors, it is optimal to hold American-style options to maturity unless they wish to capture
signiﬁcant dividend payouts. However, most executive stock options are exercised well before
maturity, even if the stock does not pay dividends. A more recent literature argues that
executives exercise their stock options too late compared to what rational undiversiﬁed investors
would do and associates this discrepancy with behavioral biases. For example, Malmendier
and Tate (2005a, b) use the voluntary delay of stock option exercises as a measure of CEO
overconﬁdence and validate this by comparing it to other measures.
The objective of this paper is to investigate alternative theories that have been developed to
explain the timing of stock option exercises. We can distinguish four categories of explanations
that have been advanced in the literature. The ﬁrst strand of the literature argues that exec-
utives exercise their options before maturity in order to sell the shares and to better diversify
their portfolios.1 Managers then have to trade oﬀ the beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation against the
cost of giving up the time value of the option. A second strand of the literature shows that
stock option exercise decisions are inﬂuenced by a range of behavioral factors. For example,
individuals seem to exercise their stock options earlier if their company's stock trades above
the maximum of recent stock price, and later when the stock falls below a recent minimum,
which suggests that individuals compare stock prices to a reference stock prices.2 A third line
of analysis shows that executives seem to anticipate future stock price developments and time
their option exercises accordingly (Carpenter and Remmers, 2001). Finally, executives may
exercise stock options because they are subject to exogenous shocks, for example when they
need to ﬁnance major consumption items or when they leave the ﬁrm and would otherwise
forfeit their options.3 All these explanations are not mutually exclusive and it is conceivable
that one or even all four of these explanations contribute to the explanation of stock option
exercise behavior. This paper evaluates the explanatory power of these theoretical approaches.
1The ﬁrst paper to develop a formal model that incorporates this argument is Huddart (1994). Later papers
followed up on this analysis, but extended the model to incorporate motives other than diversiﬁcation beneﬁts,
such as liquidity shocks (Carpenter, 1998).
2An early paper is Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999), see also Sautner and Weber (2006, 2008).
3Liquidity shocks are modeled in reduced form in Jennergren and Näslund (1993). Carpenter (1998) incor-
porates exogenous shocks into a utility-based model and ﬁnds that a model based on exogenous liquidity shocks
performs better than a model based on utility-based arguments. However, Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005)
ﬁnd that for a diﬀerent and much larger sample the utility-based argument has additional explanatory power
relative to a model based entirely on exogenous shocks.
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The methodological innovation of this paper is the use of hazard analysis, where the depen-
dent variable is the conditional probability that a particular option is exercised, given that it
has not been exercised so far.4 Two approaches have been used in the literature on stock option
exercises. One group of studies uses a binomial approach and models stock option exercise be-
havior. The model is then calibrated to the median parameters of an appropriately constructed
sample.5 The authors of these studies then compare the predictions of their models with respect
to salient parameters (e.g., the stock price at exercise, the remaining maturity at exercise) with
those observed in the data. An alternative and more empirical approach estimates a regression
model to predict stock option exercises.6 Hazard analysis oﬀers three advantages compared
to these approaches. First, hazard analysis incorporates the fact that our data are censored
because we cannot observe many option packages until maturity, either because the option is
still alive (which is true for most options in our sample), or because the holder of the option
left the ﬁrm; the ﬁling records are then incomplete. Censored observations bias regression esti-
mates, but can be treated appropriately with hazard analysis. Second, hazard analysis allows
us to enter time-varying independent variables. Many variables we are interested in (e.g., func-
tions of the stock price and stock returns, investor sentiment, the maturity of the option) are
time-varying, so hazard analysis provides a natural tool for the analysis of these data. Third
and ﬁnally, in addition to the variables suggested by the four groups of explanations discussed
above, we can also control for a number of institutional features that vary over the lifetime
of the option and that inﬂuence the timing of stock option exercises. This includes blackout
periods, vesting periods, and seasonal eﬀects.
We analyze a data set with 187,696 option packages of 15,683 executives at 2,326 ﬁrms based
on the Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) of Thomson Financial that vest between 1995 and 2006.
We ﬁnd that a number of behavioral factors identiﬁed in the literature have ﬁrst-order impact
on stock option exercise decisions. In particular, executives respond to past stock returns in a
way which suggests that they expect short-term trends to revert back to the mean, and there is
somewhat weaker evidence that they extrapolate long-term trends in past stock prices. Salient
4Hazard analysis is also called survival analysis, duration analysis, transition analysis, our failure time
analysis. The ﬁrst paper to apply hazard analysis to option exercise decisions is Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and
Larcker (2007). However, they apply this to a data set from many employees from a small number of ﬁrms,
whereas we use a data set with the top managers from a large number of ﬁrms. Armstrong, Jagolinzer,
and Larcker (2007) focus more on the implications for ESO valuation and less on the analysis of competing
explanatory approaches to explain stock option exercises.
5The ﬁrst binomial model is Huddart (1994). Carpenter (1998) and Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005)
calibrate binomial trees to match the moments of their samples by minimizing a loss function, which measures
the distance between the predicted moments and the sample moments.
6Huddart and Lang (1996), Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999), and Hallock and Olson (2006) fall into this
category.
2
statistics of past prices, like the maximum or the minimum price over the last year also have a
strong inﬂuence, which is consistent with the explanation that past prices anchor perceptions
and provide reference levels. We also ﬁnd some support for the notion that managers time their
option exercises because of inside information. By contrast, the variables suggested by utility
theory do not work very well. Executives of ﬁrms whose stock is easier to hedge with the stock
market index (and who, accordingly, are faced with less risk from the option overall) exercise
their options earlier and some proxies of executives' wealth predict earlier exercises. These
ﬁndings contradict the predictions of utility theory and do therefore not support the notion
that executives exercise their stock options early in order to diversify their portfolios. Finally,
we cannot analyze the theory that option exercises are determined by consumption needs and
similar exogenous events because we cannot relate these to observable variables.
The next Section 2 describes the construction of our data set. Section 3 provides more details
on the methodology and develops the hypotheses and the corresponding variable deﬁnitions
in more detail. Section 4 contains the main results of the paper. Section 5 provides some
robustness checks and Section 6 concludes.
2 Data sources
Our main data source is the Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) provided by Thomson Financial,
which is based on the following information executives (insiders) have to ﬁle with the SEC: Form
3 (Initial Statement of Beneﬁcial Ownership of Securities), Form 4 (Statement of Changes of
Beneﬁcial Ownership of Securities), and Form 5 (Annual Statement of Beneﬁcial Ownership
of Securities) . Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 insiders in this sense
are mainly direct and indirect beneﬁcial owners of more than ten percent of any class of equity
securities and any director and any oﬃcer of the issuer of such securities (Rule 16a-2).7 Insiders
have to ﬁle transactions in derivative securities as well as in non-derivative securities, such as
stock. These ﬁlings contain the numbers of securities transacted or held, transaction dates,
expiration dates, strike prices, and vesting dates. The ﬁlings contain a verbal description of
the respective vesting scheme instead of a date if vesting depends on other aspects than the
date. However, IFDF does not contain verbal descriptions of vesting schemes. In this case the
vesting date is missing.
7Rule 16a-1(f) deﬁnes oﬃcer to include the president, principal ﬁnancial oﬃcer, principal accounting oﬃcer,
any vice-president of the issuer in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as sales,
administration, or ﬁnance), any other oﬃcer who performs a policy-making function, or any other person who
performs similar policy-making functions for the company.
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IFDF contains ﬁlings of insiders' transactions in their companies' securities as well as hold-
ing records for stock and for derivative securities. Transactions included are, among others,
purchases and grants of stock and options, sales, exercises, deliveries of withholding securities
in order to pay an option's exercise price or the associated tax liability, the expiration or cancel-
lations of derivatives, gifts of securities, dispositions to the issuer (e.g., forfeiture due to failure
to meet performance targets, reloads), and transactions in equity swaps.8 For derivative secu-
rities, IFDF has diﬀerent transaction codes for executive stock options (ESOs) and for market
traded options.
We obtain the database for 2007. We extract all option packages that have at least one
record with an ESO transaction code (grant, ESO exercise, delivery of stock to the issuer to pay
for the exercise price) and non-missing entries in the identifying variables person ID, CUSIP
of the underlying security, strike price, vesting date, and expiration date. For our analysis we
remove all observations with incomplete or missing information about the vesting scheme. We
retain only grants that vest between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2006. In total, we
obtain 1,534,713 option packages that account for 204,304 exercises by 124,766 insiders. The
steps of the construction of the sample are summarized in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
We match the IFDF data to the 2007 version of ExecuComp to obtain additional information
about the executives themselves.9 From ExecuComp we obtain the beginning and the end of
employment by the company, the ﬁscal year end, and annual data on total compensation, the
sum of base salary and bonus, the Black-Scholes value of options granted, and the value of
restricted stock granted. We lose 1,264,340 option packages because we cannot match them
to ExecuComp, mostly because ExecuComp covers larger ﬁrms and only the top 5 managers,
whereas IFDF also covers smaller ﬁrms and insiders other than the top 5 executives. Missing
observations in dollar denominated variables are set to zero.
We match this data with stock price data from Datastream. We lose another 37,343 options
8Withholding securities is IFDF's terminology for a transaction where insiders can pay an option's strike
price at exercise with the redeemed stock. IFDF separates this transaction: In the ﬁrst transaction insiders
receive all underlying shares, in the second transaction they give back some of these withheld shares to pay for
the strike price. Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon (2001) analyzed the use of zero cost collars and equity swaps by
corporate insiders. From January 1996 to December 1998 they identiﬁed 87 collar transactions and two equity
swap transaction and found that insiders reduced their eﬀective ownership positions by such transactions on
average by 25%.
9We can match by person names and ﬁrms' CUSIPs. We match by ﬁrst name, middle name, last name, and
name aﬃx (Jr., Sr., etc.). Sometimes one database contains the aﬃx, whereas the other database does not.
In such cases, we match by ﬁrst name, middle name, and last name. If the middle name is also not available in
one database, then we match by ﬁrst name and last name only.
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because we cannot match observations to Datastream or because there is no stock price infor-
mation on Datastream for the relevant period. Finally, we are only interested in options that
are potentially exercisable. We therefore omit all options (45,334 in total) that are out of the
money for the entire period from the vesting date to maturity. Executives sometimes exercise
only a fraction of the option package. We therefore have to decide which of these exercise
decisions to include. We are only interested in exercises that are economically signiﬁcant and
therefore only count those exercise decisions where at least 25% of the option package initially
granted is exercised. Our ﬁnal sample covers 187,696 option packages from 15,683 executives
and 2,326 ﬁrms. For these options IFDF records 32,295 exercises.
We obtain annual dividend yields from Datastream. For ﬁrms-years with missing dividend
information we set the dividend yield to zero. Additionally, we get dates of earnings announce-
ments, dividend payments, and accounting data from WorldScope. The later hazard analysis
will be based on weekly data. Thus, multiple exercises within one week will be aggregated into
one single exercise decision.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
The subjects of our analysis are option packages. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics
for option packages at the vesting date for those options that are in the money for at least
one week during the period between the vesting date and the maturity date. Executive stock
options are American options, hence we follow Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) and calculate
option values using the model of Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987), which accounts for the early
exercise premium for American options when the underlying stock pays dividends. We refer
to these values as BAW-values from here on. For non-dividend paying stocks the BAW-values
coincide with the Black/Scholes values.10 We further report the time to maturity at the vesting
date, the moneyness, the volatility based on returns for the past 52 weeks, the dividend yields
at the end of the last calendar year, and the interest rate. For the interest rate we use zero
coupon yields with maturities of 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10 years and use the bond with a maturity that
is closest to the maturity of the respective option. The value of option packages at the vesting
date is $0.87 million on average (median: $0.09 million). Of the 187,696 option packages in
our sample, 144,314 or 77% are in the money at the vesting date with an average stock price
to strike price ratio of 7.48 (median: 1.29). The dividend yield is on average 0.79% (median:
10A more appropriate model for risk-averse managers is probably Detemple and Sundaresan (1999). However,
their model requires the knowledge not only of managers' wealth, but also of the liquid portion of their wealth
as well as assumptions about trading restrictions. We can therefore not implement their model.
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0.00%). Hence, the price diﬀerence between American and European options plays a role for
less than half of the option packages in our sample.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on stock option exercise decisions. We observe early
exercises of some or all of the options for 29,442 option packages (16% of the sample). There
are on average 1.10 exercises per option package for those packages where some options are
exercised early. On average, 83% of an option package is exercised if at least some options
are exercised early. Hence, multiple exercises per option package exist, but they play a minor
role in our sample. The median option is either fully exercised or fully held. If managers
would minimize the costs from giving up the time value of the option, then they should always
exercise the option with the highest ratio of the BAW-value to the inner value ﬁrst, and they
should exercise the options with the lowest ratio of the BAW-value to the inner value last.
We see that in 36% of all cases managers exercise the option package with the minimum loss
in time value. However, in 15% they exercise the option with the largest loss in time value.
Finally, we ask to what extent the exercise boundary speciﬁed by the Barone-Adesi and Whaley
(1987)-model is relevant for stock option exercise decisions. Only 18% of all exercises of options
of dividend paying stock occur above this exercise threshold. This suggests that most of the
exercise activity for ESOs is not related to dividends in the way speciﬁed by the BAW-model.
For the hazard analysis we use weekly data and exclude all weeks where an option package
is out of the money.11 We only include options where the vesting date is available, so the
standard left censoring problem considered in hazard analysis (options where the beginning
of their relevant lifetime cannot be observed) does not exist for our data set. However, for
14% of all option packages in our sample we do not observe the grant date and there may be
option packages that do not enter the database because their grant is not recorded on IFDF
and they are not exercised early. We keep options without grant information in the data set
and deﬁne the number of options granted as the number of options held at the ﬁrst available
transaction record or holdings record. For these options we potentially underestimate the total
number of options granted and therefore overestimate the fraction that is exercised. If the
number of options exercised exceeds the number of options granted we redeﬁne the number
of options granted as the total number of options exercised. Option packages without a grant
record account for 87% of the exercises in our sample and we retain these observations, because
11Exercise of out-of-the-money call options is possible but irrational. For an analysis of irrational exercise
behavior for exchange traded options see Poteshman and Serbin (2001).
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otherwise a large number of observed exercises would be lost. Grant dates tend to be missing
for those option packages that were granted earlier, presumably because the coverage of the
database was then less complete. For grants after 2000 the grant date is usually available. Since
the options granted after 2000 have mostly not yet expired we observe fewer exercises for these
options.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
Right censoring is present in our analysis whenever we have no record of the exercise of an
option. Since multiple exercises per option package are possible, an option package may be
right censored even if a fraction of it was exercised early. We are interested in early exercises
only because they involve an economic decision by the manager. Exercises at maturity are
outside the scope of our analysis because they result from the decision not to exercise earlier
and are therefore covered indirectly by the analysis of early exercises. Hence, from the point
of view of our analysis all options that are not exercised until one week before they expire are
right censored.
Right censoring occurs also because insiders leave the ﬁrm. Usually insiders have to exercise
their ESOs within a certain period of time after they left the ﬁrm, otherwise their ESOs forfeit.
However, the exact regulations are ﬁrm-speciﬁc and we do not have data on these.12 We
therefore take the date when an executive leaves the ﬁrm (which we obtain from ExecuComp)
as the censoring date. All exercises after this data, some but not all of which are recorded on
IFDF, are therefore not included in our data set. Finally, all options that are still alive at the
end of January 2007 are right censored because the coverage from our IFDF version ends on
that date.
Table 4 shows the relative importance of right censoring reasons for the option packages
in our sample. The table also shows if option packages are in the money (ITM) or out of the
money at the censoring date. If some portion of an option package is disposed of early (through
exercises or gifts) while the remaining part is censored, we report the option package in the
table as censored only if the larger part is censored. The major reason for right censoring
(71.9% of the sample) is that the database records only exercises until January 2007. From the
remaining 28.1%, only about one quarter (7.7%) of the options expire.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
12Dahiya and Yermack (2007) have a detailed discussion of the rules for option forfeiture in these cases.
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Table 5 presents key ﬁnancial statistics and compares the ﬁrms retained in our ﬁnal sample
(Panel A) with the ﬁrms on IFDF (Panel B). For each ﬁrm we ﬁrst average the observations
from 1996 to 2006 for all years where at least one option package exists and where we have data
and then calculate the summary statistics reported in the table. The main observation from
Table 5 is that our sample covers mainly large ﬁrms, whereas IFDF also covers smaller ﬁrms.
The reason is our match with ExecuComp, which covers mainly the S&P1500 companies. As a
result, the median ﬁrm in the sample is larger than the median IFDF ﬁrm by a factor of about
10 in terms of market capitalization, total assets, and sales. Also the number of employees with
option grants is higher in our sample than is the IFDF raw data.
3 Methodology and hypotheses
3.1 Methodology
We analyze stock option exercise patterns by CEOs and other insiders by using hazard anal-
ysis.13 To ﬁx ideas, denote by f (t, xt) the probability density function for the event that the
insider exercises her option package at time t, where the variables relevant for the decision
(characteristics of the option package, the ﬁrm, the market environment, and the insider) are
summarized in a vector of (potentially time-varying) variables xt. Let F (t, xt) be the cumulative
density function associated with f . Then the hazard rate h (t, xt) = f(t, xt)/ (1− F (t, xt)) is
deﬁned as the conditional instantaneous probability that the insider exercises her stock options
at time t if she has not exercised them yet.14
In principle, we could estimate the conditional density f directly, for example by way of a
logit or probit model and then infer unconditional probabilities.15 Apart from the methodolog-
ical diﬃculties of actually doing so, direct estimation of the hazard rate h (t, xt) oﬀers three
major advantages, which we outline in the introduction. First, hazard analysis allows us to
include time-varying state variables (covariates) xt . For example, we will be interested in the
likelihood that the insider exercises her options conditional on the stock price development prior
to time t, conditional on the stock price and the value of her portfolio at time t, and conditional
13The discussion in this section is based on Kiefer (1988), Lancaster (1990), and chapter 17 of Cameron and
Trivedi (2005).
14This is only a conceptual discussion to ﬁx ideas. Our deﬁnition of Exercise implies that the same option
package can be exercised more than once (multiple spell analysis). Our econometric analysis accounts for this
fact. We keep options in the analysis as long as at least an economically signiﬁcant fraction of the initially
granted number of options (25 %) is left.
15In his survey, Kiefer (1988) insists that the hazard function approach does not identify new parameters (p.
649) because parameterizing the problem in terms of conditional or unconditional probabilities is equivalent.
8
on time-dependent events like blackout periods or the arrival of new option grants. These time-
varying covariates can be naturally included in hazard analysis. Second, hazard analysis can
easily deal with censoring of the data. We have right censoring but no left censoring in our
sample (see the discussion in Section 2, in particular Table 4 above). Neglecting such censoring
therefore biases the estimate of the hazard rate upwards because some exercise decisions are
not observed. Third, this analysis allows us to control for time-varying institutional factors.
We proceed by using the Weibull-model, a standard parametric hazard model used in a
range of economic applications, which is speciﬁed as follows:
h (t, xt) = pt
p−1exp {β0 + x′tβ} ,(1)
where xt is the time-varying vector of covariates, p and β0 are scalars, and β is a vector of
coeﬃcients. Conventionally, the expression for h (t, xt) is factored into two components. The
ﬁrst is ptp−1exp {β0} and referred to as the baseline hazard, whereas the second exp {x′tβ} is
the relative hazard. We express all non-dummy covariates in mean-deviations, scaled by the
standard deviation. So, the relative hazard equals 1 for an option grant where all non-dummy
variables are at their means and all dummy variables equal zero. For such an option grant
the hazard rate is h (t, x) = ptp−1exp {β0}, so the baseline hazard can be interpreted as the
conditional density of exercising an option if all non-dummy covariates are at their means and
all dummy variables are zero. We use clustered robust standard errors at the level of the ﬁrm
since many variables (stock price developments, alphas, CARs, volatility, correlation, weeks of
earnings or dividends, etc.) are identical for all individuals and option grants of the same ﬁrm.
An important special case considered in the literature is the exponential hazard function,
which is obtained from (1) by setting p = 1, so the baseline hazard rate becomes exp {β0} and
therefore independent of time. The Weibull model (1) used here is more ﬂexible and allows for
the case where p < 1 (p > 1), then the hazard rate is decreasing (increasing). The conditional
probability for an option to be exercised over a period of length ∆t can be approximated
by h (t, xt) ∆t and decreasing hazard rate means that this probability is decreasing over time,
holding everything else constant.16 An attractive feature of the Weibull model is this separation
of the direct impact of time, which is captured in the baseline hazard rate, from the impact
of the time-varying covariates xt. Hazard rate models are deﬁned in continuous time, so we
have to use a discrete-time approximation. We follow Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) and
16Kiefer (1988) highlights the possibility of obtaining constant hazard rates as a special case of the Weibull
model as an additional advantage of this model over the lognormal or the log-logistic models or over the direct
estimation of unconditional probabilities.
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use weekly observations.
3.2 Variable deﬁnitions and hypothesis development
In this Section we introduce the covariates included in our hazard rate model. We group
variables by the diﬀerent hypotheses that have been advanced in the literature as explanations
of early stock option exercises by executives. Table 6 provides a detailed overview of all variables
and their deﬁnitions used in this paper.
[Insert Table 6 about here.]
Dependent variable: Exercise. The unit of investigation for our study is an option grant
or package. The dependent variable in all our regressions is the dummy variable Exerciset,
which assumes a value of one if the options in the grant are exercised at time t and zero
otherwise. However, often managers do not exercise the options from the same grant all at the
same time. We therefore deﬁne Exerciset as the event where the manager exercises at least
25% of the options originally granted in one option grant. Hence, exercises of less than 25%
of grant j at time t imply that Exercisejt = 0, and grants where less than 25% of the options
granted initially are left are dropped from the analysis. Sometimes managers receive options
with diﬀerent conditions (strike prices, vesting periods) at the same date and we treat these as
separate grants, so all options in one grant have the same strike price and are subject to the
same vesting conditions. The 25%-threshold is somewhat arbitrary, and we also provide results
in Section 5 where the threshold value is set to 10% and where it is set to 50%, respectively.
Behavioral explanations. To the best of our knowledge, Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999)
were the ﬁrst to explicitly introduce behavioral factors into the analysis of stock option exercise
patterns. They show that individuals' exercise decisions respond to past stock prices, which
cannot be rationalized by explanations based on utility theory. We follow Heath, Huddart, and
Lang (1999) and group behavioral explanations into two sets: Explanations based on beliefs
and explanations based on preferences. Individuals seem to form beliefs based on the rule that
short-term trends revert back to the mean, whereas long-term trends continue.17 If managers
believe that a recent upward trend in their company's stock reverts to the mean, then they
believe that their stock is currently overvalued, so it becomes optimal for them to exercise the
option and sell the overvalued stock now, providing the time value is not too large. By contrast,
if managers believe a trend to continue, then exercising now is not optimal.
17Kahneman and Tversky (1973), Tversky and Kahneman (1971).
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We expect individuals to pay attention to whether their stock outperforms or underperforms
the market. We therefore regress the stock of the company on the S&P 500 stock market
index and compute the intercept α = rStock − βrMarket from this regression as a measure of
outperformance relative to the market index. The psychological literature does not specify
when a trend has to be regarded as short (and therefore mean-reverting) and when it has to
be regarded as long. We therefore use three deﬁnitions of α, Alpha26, Alpha52, and Alpha156,
which are the α-estimates over 26 weeks, 52 weeks, and 156 weeks, respectively.
Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) refer to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
to motivate the notion that individuals value their options by comparing the current stock
price to a reference price. If the stock trades above this reference price, then individuals are
risk-averse and evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of option exercises like a risk-averse investor.
However, if the stock trades signiﬁcantly below the reference price, then individuals become
risk-seeking. A loss-averse manager whose company's stock trades below her reference price is
therefore unlikely to exercise her options.18 The psychological literature oﬀers little guidance
on how individuals set their reference prices and we follow Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999)
and include MaxPrice, a dummy variable which is one if the stock price in week t is above
its maximum over the preceding 52 weeks. Similarly, we deﬁne MinPrice to equal one if the
stock trades below its 52-week minimum. We expect that individuals exercise their options
more frequently if the stock trades above their reference point and less frequently if it trades
below their reference point. Consequently, the predicted coeﬃcient on MaxPrice is positive
and the predicted coeﬃcient on MinPrice is negative.
Many authors have documented the impact of investor sentiment on asset prices.19 We
expect that stock option exercise decisions also respond to investor sentiment. If managers
behave like small retail investors, then we expect that they invest more in risky stocks if
investor sentiment is bullish and less if investor sentiment is bearish. Accordingly, we expect
that managers who are subject to investor sentiment exercise their options later if investor
sentiment is high. However, if managers are more rational, they may recognize that prices
are temporarily bid up by bullish noise traders (or depressed in the opposite case) and then
exercise their options earlier. For the purpose of our analysis we adopt the view of Lemmon
and Portniaguina (2008) and Qiu and Welch (2006) and use a measure of consumer conﬁdence
as an indicator of investor sentiment.20 We use CCI as an index of consumer conﬁdence and
18Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) relate their argument about reference-dependence to the disposition
eﬀect. However, it is not clear to what extent loss-aversion can explain the disposition eﬀect.
19For an early paper see Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991).
20See Baker and Wurgler (2006) for a discussion of several other measures of investor sentiment.
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expect the coeﬃcient on this index to be negative if managers behave like noise traders, and
we expect it to be positive if they act like rational investors.
Utility theory. The starting point of utility theory is the observation that insiders exercise
their stock options early because their investment in their own company's securities exposes
them to ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk. Exercising their stock options early allows insiders to diversify their
portfolio, in particular when they sell the stock they receive from exercising their options.
Huddart (1994) develops a theoretical model along these lines, which analyzes the trade-oﬀ
between the beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation and the costs of giving up the remaining time value of
the option. In his model, the manager has power utility, so her absolute risk aversion decreases
in her wealth.
A manager with constant relative risk aversion is more likely to exercise her stock options
earlier if: (1) she is more risk averse, (2) if she is less wealthy, so that her absolute risk aversion
is lower; (3) if a larger fraction of her wealth is invested in the ﬁrm's securities. If the manager is
more risk averse, then she gives a higher weight to the costs of having an undiversiﬁed portfolio
and therefore exercises earlier. Similarly, if she is less wealthy, her absolute risk aversion and
her beneﬁt from diversifying is lower, so she exercises later.
The eﬀect of the stock's volatility on the decision to exercise early is ambiguous as there
two eﬀects here. Higher volatility makes the option more risky, so that a risk-averse manager
would exercise early. However, volatility also increases the time value of the option. The ﬁrst
eﬀect outweighs the second eﬀect only if the manager is suﬃciently risk-averse, so we cannot
make an unqualiﬁed prediction here.
We cannot observe managers' wealth directly as this would require knowledge of each man-
ager's non-ﬁrm related wealth.21 We therefore construct three variables based on the manager's
compensation. FirmSecuritiesjt is the value of all shares (restricted stock as reported in Exe-
cuComp) and the entire option portfolio of the manager, with the exception of grant j, where
grant j refers to the current option package. V alueThisGrantjt is the Barone-Adesi and Wha-
ley (1987) value of all options in grant j that have not been exercised until time t and that
were excluded from FirmSecuritiesjt. From the point of view of utility theory there should
be no diﬀerence between wealth invested in option grant j and wealth invested in other secu-
rities, so we should expect the coeﬃcients on FirmSecuritiesjt and V alueThisGrantjt to be
21Becker (2006) has data on CEO wealth for Sweden, but this data is not available for the US. Dittmann and
Maug (2007) approximate CEO wealth by assuming a reinvestment scheme based on the CEO's past income,
but this requires knowledge of at least ﬁve years of past data, which is also not available for most managers in
our sample.
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similar. Finally, OtherCompensationt summarizes ﬁxed salary and bonus and therefore those
compensation components that do not depend on the stock price. We expect the coeﬃcients
on all components of wealth to be negative and the coeﬃcient on OtherCompensation should
be largest in absolute value since OtherCompensation adds less risk than the other proxies for
wealth.
We measure the riskiness of the ﬁrm by two variables. V olatilityt is deﬁned as the stan-
dard deviation of stock returns calculated over the 52 weeks preceding week t. Correlationt is
the coeﬃcient of correlation between the ﬁrm's stock return and the return on the S&P 500.
Correlation captures the idea that the manager can hedge the market-risk of the stock by
trading in the stock market, whereas she cannot hedge the idiosyncratic risk of the ﬁrm.22 We
expect that managers exercise options earlier if the idiosyncratic risk is higher, so the coeﬃ-
cient on Correlation should be positive. For the reasons mentioned above we cannot make an
unambiguous prediction for the coeﬃcient on volatility.
The model in Huddart (1994) develops an exercise boundary in terms of the ratio of the stock
price to the strike price of the option, St/K. We deﬁne this variable as Moneyness and expect
that it has a positive coeﬃcient: if St/K is above its critical value, then the manager should
exercise the option, whereas she should not exercise if Moneyness is below its critical value.
Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) argue that the exercise boundary deﬁned in Huddart (1994)
is a non-linear function of the maturity of the option. We therefore adopt the same approach
as Huddart and Lang (1996) and also use the square of Moneyness, deﬁned as Moneyness2.
Institutional variables and constraints. Managers' exercise decisions are subject to a
range of institutional constraints. We introduce a number of variables here to capture these
constraints. These variables cannot necessarily be related to any of the theoretical explanations
of option exercise behavior we are interested in, but in the context of our approach it seems
appropriate to include the relevant variables as controls.
First, and most obvious, is the vesting period itself, which prevents managers from exercising
their options before the vesting date. Utility theory predicts that managers exercise their
options immediately after the vesting date if the stock price on the vesting date exceeds a
certain threshold. Similarly, the behavioral explanations may also imply that a manager would
sell her options, for example, because she believes the stock price to drop or because the stock
22Cai and Vijh (2005) present a utility based ESO valuation model where the manager can invest in the
risk-free money market account and two correlated risky assets: stock and market portfolio. They show that
managers value options subjectively higher when the the correlation between returns of the stock and the returns
of the market portfolio is high.
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price is suﬃciently above her reference price. In either case, the vesting constraint is binding
and we should expect that managers exercise a signiﬁcant portion of their options immediately
after the options vest. We include V estingWeek, a dummy variable which equals one in the
week of and the week after the option vests and expect the coeﬃcient on this variable to be
positive.
Managers may also respond to the arrival of new option grants by exercising more of their
existing options. This would always happen if managers have some target ownership of stock
options, so that a new option grant increases their holdings above their target level.23 For
example, ownership guidelines or more implicit components of managers' contracts may oblige
them to hold a certain portion of their wealth in their companies' securities. From the point
of view of utility theory, managers would exercise their existing options if they receive a new
grant simply because new option grants increase the exposure of the manager to ﬁrm risk.
We include GrantWeekBefore, a dummy variable which equals one in the week before the
manager receives a new option grant, and GrantWeekAfter, a dummy variable which equals
one in the week of and the week after a new option grant. We expect the coeﬃcients on both
variables to be positive.
Most ﬁrms restrict trading of insiders by imposing black-out periods where insiders are
not allowed to trade. Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) show that 92% of the ﬁrms in their
sample impose such trading restrictions and that these trading restrictions lead to a signiﬁcant
decline in trading activity and a narrowing of bid-ask spreads for the ﬁrm's stock. They show
that a common window imposed for trading is 3-12 days after earnings announcements. Since
most managers sell the shares they receive from option exercises immediately upon exercise, we
expect that trading restrictions around earnings announcements also aﬀect exercise patterns.
We capture this with two variables, EarnAnnounceBefore, a dummy variable which equals one
in the week before the earnings announcement, and EarnAnnounceAfter, a dummy variable
which equals one in the week of until two weeks after earnings announcements. If stock option
exercises respond to trading restrictions for the company's stock, then we expect the coeﬃcient
on EarnAnnounceBefore to be negative and the coeﬃcient on EarnAnnounceAfter to be
positive.
Managers may adjust their exercise strategies to their companies' dividend policies if their
options are not dividend protected.24 They beneﬁt by exercising the option as long as it still
23The results from Ofek and Yermack (2000) are consistent with the notion that senior managers have
ownership targets with respect to their stock holdings, so that they build up their ownership if they are below
this target.
24If dividend protection arises through adjustments in the strike price the strike price in IFDF is missing.
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trades cum dividend. We therefore included Dividend and DividendY ield to capture this
aspect. Dividend is a dummy variable which equals one in the week before and the week of
a dividend payment. We also need to take into account that any investor would exercise the
option before a dividend payment only if capturing the dividend is suﬃciently important relative
to giving up the time value of the option. The Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987)-model (BAW-
model) speciﬁes a boundary of the stock price, where exercising is optimal only if the stock
price is above this boundary. We therefore deﬁne BAWBound as a dummy variable that equals
one if the stock price is above the BAW-boundary and zero otherwise. DividendY ield is the
dividend yield at the end of the last calendar year and measures the size of the dividend captured
through early exercise. We expect the coeﬃcients on both, Dividend and DividendY ield to
be positive.
Asymmetric information. Employees of the companies in our sample may have private
information and time their stock option exercises. Huddart and Lang (1996) ﬁnd exercise
patterns consistent with this notion. Interestingly, they cannot detect signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between senior managers and lower-level employees in their sample. However, managers who
exercise their stock options in advance of the disclosure of bad news by the ﬁrm may be
charged with insider trading. This is more likely to be the case for news disclosures that
follow immediately after managers exercised their options compared to news that cannot be
easily related to managers' exercise decisions. We therefore calculate the cumulative abnormal
returns for the weeks following exercise decisions and include as variables in our regressions
CAR2, CAR13, and CAR26, the cumulative abnormal returns for, respectively, 2 weeks, 13
weeks, and 26 weeks after week t.
Other explanations and control variables. We include some additional variables that
cannot be related to particular hypotheses. We include dummy variables Quarter2, Quarter3,
and Quarter4 to capture potential seasonal eﬀects in exercise patterns.
Exercise behavior may depend on the status of the manager in the hierarchy of the ﬁrm.
However, without a detailed understanding of the internal organization of the ﬁrm and the
assignment of labels to particular positions it is diﬃcult to assign individual managers to layers
in the corporate hierarchy in a way that is comparable across ﬁrms. Also, we match the IFDF
data to ExecuComp and have therefore only data on the top ﬁve executives. We therefore
distinguish only between the CEO and other managers. We expect that CEOs are more likely
Hence, such options are dropped from our sample.
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to hold options for incentive reasons and to be subject to ownership guidelines compared to
lower-level employees. Also, CEOs may be subject to the illusion from control and believe the
stock price to rise and therefore their stock options to be undervalued. Any of these reasons
would reduce their exercise rates compared to those of other managers. We therefore include a
dummy that equals one for CEOs.
All managers will trade oﬀ the beneﬁts from early exercise against the costs of losing the
time value of the option. The foregone time value should therefore be included irrespective of
whether the beneﬁts are better described by rational, behavioral, or institutional factors. We
include two variables to capture this. First, the variable InnerV alue is deﬁned as the inner
value of the option (stock prices minus strike prices), divided by its Barone-Adesi and Whaley
(1987)-value (BAW-value). For options where the time value is large, this ratio is signiﬁcantly
smaller than one, for options where the time value is negligible, the BAW-value is almost equal
to the inner value and then InnerV alue equals one.25 We expect that managers exercise options
where the ratio of inner value to Black-Scholes value is large, so the coeﬃcient on InnerV alue
should be positive. Second, we also include Maturity, which is the remaining maturity of the
option. In addition, we also expect that whenever managers exercise their options at maturity,
they will do so somewhat close to the maturity date. We deﬁne Maturity4WeeksBefore as
a dummy variable, which equals one in the four weeks before the maturity of the option and
zero otherwise. We expect that many managers exercise their options shortly before maturity,
so the coeﬃcient on this variable should be positive.
Several authors have suggested exogenous shocks as an additional explanation for the early
exercise of stock options. However, we do not have any data on these exogenous shocks and we
can therefore not test this theory.26
Table 7 provides summary statistics of all independent variables used in our regressions.
[Insert Table 7 about here.]
The mean ofMaxPrice indicates that the stock price is above its 52 weeks maximum in 16%
of all weeks. Conversely, the probability that the stock price is below its 52 weeks minimum is
only 2.3%. To some extent, this asymmetry arises because we include only weekly observations
where options are in the money. The median option holder owns ﬁrm securities (other than
25Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2007) use the remaining time to maturity of the option to capture
the inner value. Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) use the estimator of Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) for
American options instead of Black-Scholes for approximating the value of the option. We expect that all three
proxies for inner value will be highly correlated.
26Liu and Yermack (2007) hand collect data on CEO's home purchases, which may represent the most
important source of liquidity needs for CEOs. Their data cover only a very small part of our data set.
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the current option package) with a value of $8.89 million and receives annual base salary and
bonus of $545,000 (not tabulated). 15% of our option packages are held by CEOs.
4 Analysis
We need to break up our sample into several parts because the estimation of the model is
computationally infeasible for larger data sets. This also allows us to compare results across
subsamples. We therefore group our observations randomly into 10 subsamples, where we
assign all observations for the same option package to the same subsample. We summarize the
estimation results in two tables.
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here.]
Table 8 reports the hazard rates that follow from our coeﬃcient estimates for β0,β, and p
from equation (1) separately for each subsample. We report relative hazard rates for individual
variables as hri = exp {βi} − 1 to ease interpretation.27 We express all variables other than
dummy variables as deviations from their means, scaled by their standard deviations. Hence, if
exp {βi}− 1 equals 0.3, then this implies that a one standard deviation increase in xi increases
the probability of exercise in week t by 30%. For the dummy variables exp {βi} − 1 is simply
the change in the hazard rate if the dummy variable changes its value from zero to one. The
reported R2 represents the adjusted proportion of explained variation for proportional-hazards
(PH) models for censored survival data (Royston, 2006).
Table 9 summarizes the results for all subsamples and shows the average hazard rate (av-
eraged over all ten subsamples), the coeﬃcient of variation of the hazard rate, deﬁned as the
standard deviation over all ten subsamples divided by the mean coeﬃcient; an aggregated t-
statistic, which divides the mean coeﬃcient by the aggregate standard deviation, calculated as√∑k=10
k=1 σ
2
k, where k indicates the respective subsample; the number of positive coeﬃcients, the
number of negative coeﬃcients, the number of coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the 5%-level
and positive, and the number of coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the 5%-level and negative.
The estimates in Tables 8 to 9 refer to the baseline case where the dependent variable
Exercise is deﬁned to be one whenever at least 25% of an option grant are exercised. We perform
robustness checks for diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the dependent variable where this threshold is set
to 10% and 50%, respectively.
27Conventionally, the relative hazard are deﬁned as exp {βi}, which then has the interpretation of a factor.
Since βi ≈ exp {βi} − 1 for suﬃciently small βi, our convention saves us from reporting separate tables for the
coeﬃcients.
17
Behavioral factors of stock option exercises. Our results support the notion that man-
agers believe in mean reversion. The coeﬃcients on Alpha26 are all positive and signiﬁcant
at the 5%-level and the aggregated t-statistic is 27. The impact is also economically large. If
the ﬁrm outperforms the benchmark by one standard deviation (1.9% p.a., see Table 7), then
the likelihood of exercising the option increases on average by 34%. Hence, managers exercise
options more frequently if their company's stock has done well recently, which suggests that
they exercise their options and sell the resulting stock because they expect the stock price to
decline. The coeﬃcients on Alpha52 are mostly positive but never signiﬁcant, so mean reversals
seem to be expected for stock price increases that last less than one year.
The coeﬃcients on Alpha156 are consistently negative but not individually signiﬁcant in
most cases. The fact that 9 coeﬃcients have the same sign and the aggregate t-statistic of
-6.45 suggest that this is a consistent eﬀect, albeit not a strong one: if Alpha156 increases by
one standard deviation, then the likelihood of exercise falls by 4%. This is consistent with the
notion that managers believe that longer term trends will continue, whereas short-term trends
will reverse. These results are in line with the ﬁndings of Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999)
with the notable diﬀerence that their deﬁnition of long-term trends refers to shorter horizons
(within one year) than our deﬁnition.
The dummy variable MaxPrice is consistently signiﬁcant with positive coeﬃcients. On
average, the likelihood that managers exercise their options increases by 65% if their company's
stock trades above its 52-week maximum. The eﬀect of MinPrice is also measurable, but
weaker (individually signiﬁcant in four cases, aggregate t-statistic of -5.37). If the stock trades
below its 52-week minimum, then the probability of exercise decreases by 31%. This supports
the notion that managers remember salient stock prices like minima and maxima and use these
to form reference points and tend to exercise their options if the stock trades above or below
these reference points.
Finally, the coeﬃcient on CCI, our measure of investor sentiment, is positive in all ten
regressions and statistically signiﬁcant in seven of them, with an aggregate t-statistic of 14.80.
A one-standard deviation increase in the consumer conﬁdence index increases the probability
of an early stock option exercise by 13%. This eﬀect is therefore economically signiﬁcant and
contradicts the notion that managers are inﬂuenced by investor sentiment in their exercise
decisions. Rather, they seem to anticipate lower future returns if investor sentiment is high and
noise traders inﬂate current prices. Then insiders exercise their stock options earlier.
Overall, we ﬁnd strong support for the notion that managers expect the reversion of recent
trends in their stock price and that they use salient past stock prices to establish a reference
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level. By contrast, the evidence for extrapolating long-term trends is weak and the correspond-
ing eﬀect small. Also, managers seem to believe that their stock price is inﬂated by investor
sentiment.
Utility theory. The coeﬃcient on Moneyness is negative in nine out of ten subsamples and
statistically negative in two cases (the aggregate t-statistic is only -0.31 though). The eﬀect
of the square of Moneyness, Moneyness2 is even weaker (aggregate t-statistic of 0.07). The
evidence is therefore not strong here and does not support the implications of utility theory
that there is an exercise boundary above which managers will exercise their options.
The implications regarding Correlation are more general and we expect a negative coeﬃ-
cient here because a higher correlation with the stock market index allows managers to hedge a
larger proportion of the risk from their options, so that they should exercise later. However, the
coeﬃcient on Correlation is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in all subsamples and implies
that a one-standard deviation increase in Correlation increases the probability of exercise by
11%. This ﬁnding is corroborated by the coeﬃcient on Volatility, which is negative and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in all subsamples, so managers of riskier ﬁrms exercise their options later.
Hence, if the need to diversify is present at all, it is suﬃciently weak to be outweighed by the
opposite eﬀect that the options of riskier ﬁrms have a higher time value and should therefore
be exercised later.
Finally, we turn to the proxies for wealth, FirmSecurities, ValueThisGrant, and OtherCom-
pensation. If these variables measure wealth, then they should all have negative coeﬃcients,
with OtherCompensation having a larger coeﬃcient in absolute value. Note that these implica-
tions hold only for speciﬁcations of utility theory that imply decreasing absolute risk aversion
(like the standard CRRA models used in the ESO literature) and not for utility theory in gen-
eral. Our ﬁndings are not consistent with the predictions of the CRRA-model. The coeﬃcient
on OtherCompensation is positive for all ten subsamples, and it is statistically signiﬁcant in
seven out of ten cases (average t-statistic is 31.81). The coeﬃcients on FirmSecuritiesj and
V alueThisGrant are always negative as predicted, but mostly insigniﬁcant. The eﬀects of all
three variables are economically moderate and imply increases of 5% (for OtherCompensation),
respectively, decreases of 5% (for V alueThisGrant and FirmSecuritiesj).
Summarizing, none of the implications of utility theory is borne out by the data and we
therefore conclude that utility theory has no explanatory power with respect to stock option
exercise behavior.
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Institutional variables. Many options are exercised immediately after they vest. The haz-
ard rate for V estingWeek shows that in the week of and the week after vesting, exercise rates
are higher by 983%. This is consistent with the notion that the vesting constraint is binding,
either for diversiﬁcation reasons or for behavioral reasons, so that managers exercise options
immediately after they vest.
Quantitatively almost as important is the impact of GrantWeekAfter, a dummy which
equals one in the week of and the week after the manager receives a new option grant. On
average, the likelihood of exercising options in the week of or in the week after a new option
grant is 410% higher than usual. This is consistent with the notion that new option grants
increase managers' option holdings above their target level. By comparison, the impact of
GrantWeekBefore is statistically insigniﬁcant in all subsamples. Overall, this evidence sug-
gests that managers try to keep their option holdings at some target level and tend to exercise
existing options when they are granted new options. Such a target level might be explained by
utility theory. If the level before the arrival of a new grant represents a portfolio equilibrium,
then the new grant increases the executive's exposure to ﬁrm-speciﬁc above its equilibrium level
and triggers exercises of existing grants. Similarly, ownership guidelines may imply a target
exposure to ﬁrm risk, so that new option grants can then be followed by exercises of existing
grants.
Trading restrictions because of blackout periods seem to be important. The coeﬃcients
on EarnAnnounceBefore and EarnAnnounceAfter always have the predicted signs and are
mostly statistically signiﬁcant. In the week before earnings announcements, exercises are on
average 63% below their normal rate (signiﬁcant in 6 subsamples). In the week after earnings
announcements, exercises are 82% above their usual level and this eﬀect is statistically signiﬁ-
cant in all subsamples. Hence, managers seem to shift their exercise decisions from the period
before earnings announcements to the period immediately after the announcement.
The coeﬃcients on Dividend are mostly negative, which contradicts the notion that man-
agers exercise options before dividend dates. However, this eﬀect is signiﬁcant in only one
subsample. The coeﬃcients on DividendY ield are always insigniﬁcant but positive in eight
out of ten subsamples (aggregate t-statistic is 4.44). The coeﬃcient on BAWBound is pos-
itive or negative half of the time. Based on the notion that managers capture dividends on
non-dividend protected options by exercising them before dividend payment dates, we expect
the signs of all three variables to be positive and ﬁnd no support for this prediction. Recall
that dividend yields are typically low (see Table 2) and dividends may therefore not play a
20
major role for our sample.28 Note that the BAW-boundary applies to a model with diversiﬁed
investors who can trade the underlying assets and may therefore not be relevant for risk-averse
executives.29 We can eﬀectively exclude the possibility that options are dividend protected
because dividend protection is normally achieved through strike price adjustments. Then there
is a footnote in the respective ﬁeld in the original ﬁlings and a missing strike price in IFDF.
We exclude derivatives with missing strike prices, so dividend protected options do not enter
our data set.
Asymmetric information. If managers exercise later because they expect positive news to
materialize, or if they exercise earlier because they expect negative news to materialize, then the
coeﬃcients on CAR2, CAR13, and CAR26 should be negative. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients
on either CAR13 or CAR26 are signiﬁcant and negative as predicted for all subsamples except
subsample 7 (only CAR26 at the 10%-level) and subsample 9. However, only one of the
coeﬃcients on CAR2 is signiﬁcant, although the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant in the aggregate
(t-statistic of -7.85). We interpret this as consistent evidence that timing considerations based
on inside information play an important role in stock option exercise decisions. We conclude
that managers have some inside knowledge that helps them to predict medium-term (one or
two quarters) developments in the stock price, but they are more cautious in using information
that will be disclosed over a period as short as two weeks.
Other variables. The coeﬃcients on InnerV alue are among the most signiﬁcant in our
analysis. The coeﬃcients are always positive and signiﬁcant at least at the 1%-level. Hence,
independently of whether behavioral reasons or diversiﬁcation motives better explain exercise
behavior, managers consistently take the cost of losing the time value of their options into
account.
CEOs exercise their options later and CEOs are 8% less likely to exercise their options
compared to the other top-5 managers. This may be because of behavioral factors (e.g., a
delusion of control) or institutional contstraints (e.g., ownership guidelines) that induce CEOs
to hold their options longer than other executives.
28The low signiﬁcance for Dividend might come from the fact that we have dividend payment dates only for
16,815 option grants out of 79,839 grants where the underlying stock pays dividends.
29Detemple and Sundaresan (1999) develop a model for risk-averse investors and short-sales restrictions in
the underlying asset. They show that the resulting exercise behavior can be described by a model where the
stock pays an additional dividend, even if the actual stock does not pay any dividends at all. This may be
conceived as the opportunity cost of not exercising the option.
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5 Robustness checks
We perform several robustness checks. First, as mentioned earlier, we redeﬁne the dependent
variable and use thresholds of 10%, respectively, 50% to deﬁne the dependent variable. We
report summary statistics analogous to Table 9.
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 about here.]
Our results are stable with respect to alternative deﬁnitions of the dependent variable.
It is particularly instructive to look at the number coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the
5%-level. These are practically identical for each variable and independent of the deﬁni-
tion of the dependent variable. If the threshold for deﬁning Exercise is higher, the eﬀects
of Alphas156 are somewhat stronger (2 versus 0 samples with signiﬁcant coeﬃcients). The
results on FirmSecuritiesj are clearer if the threshold is only 10% (all coeﬃcients negative
and signiﬁcant at the 5%-level), whereas signiﬁcance basically vanishes for the higher threshold.
The results for V alueThisGrant are most strongly aﬀected by changes in Exercise. If Exer-
cise is deﬁned with a 10%-threshold, then the coeﬃcients on V alueThisGrant are all positive
(signiﬁcant in 2 cases), while they become negative if the threshold is 25% (signiﬁcant in 3
cases) and 50% (signiﬁcant in all cases). Our interpretation is that executives are more likely
to exercise larger grants in smaller fractions, whereas they will exercise smaller grants in larger
fractions. Hence, a higher value of V alueThisGrant implies that the grant is larger and more
likely to be broken up into smaller pieces (hence, the value for the 10%-threshold is positive),
whereas a larger grant is less likely to be exercised in large parts (hence, the negative coeﬃcients
if the threshold is 25% or 50%).
Our results may be inﬂuenced by the fact that the exercise decisions of CEOs combine two
groups of decisions: option exercises where managers keep the shares, and exercises where they
sell the shares immediately after they exercise them. In particular, utility theory suggests that
the main beneﬁt from option exercises are the beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation, and managers will
obtain these beneﬁts only if they sell the shares. The fact that we also include exercises where
the shares are not sold may then bias our results against utility theory. We repeat our analysis
therefore for the subsample of all those option exercises where shares are sold. If an option
holder ﬁles at least one option exercise with a corresponding stock sale in the same SEC insider
ﬁling, we consider all transactions in this ﬁling as an exercise event, no matter to which option
package the shares initially belonged. 83% of all exercise transactions have stock sales in the
same SEC ﬁling.
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[Insert Tables 12 about here.]
Table 12 shows that the results are very similar to the previous analysis. In particular, the
coeﬃcients that support our conclusions regarding utility theory on Correlation, V olatility,
and OtherCompensation are virtually unchanged with similar signiﬁcance levels. The results
for FirmSecurities are somewhat weakened and only the signiﬁcance of V alueThisGrant has
eﬀectively vanished with ﬁve positive and ﬁve negative signiﬁcance, none of which is signiﬁcant.
By contrast, the coeﬃcients on some other variables are stronger. In particular, the coeﬃcient
on CEO has gained signiﬁcance (t-value is -9.26 instead of -6.53, signiﬁcant in 6 cases rather
than 2 before). Also, the coeﬃcient on CAR2 has become more signiﬁcant now. The coeﬃcients
on cumulative abnormal returns may be aﬀected by the fact that for option exercises the
direction of the trade may have a bigger impact. Insiders can be prosecuted for stock purchases
and stock sales alike. However, while they can be prosecuted for exercising their stock options
(and then selling the stock) when subsequent returns are negative, they cannot be prosecuted
for not exercising their options when subsequent returns are positive.
[Insert Table 13 about here.]
We conduct our analysis of past stock returns using regression-alphas. In Table 13 we
use raw returns instead of alphas. The results are similar, but the signiﬁcance is higher for
Return156 than for Alpha156 and the diﬀerence in signiﬁcance is even larger for Return52
compared to Alpha52, so the results seem to be more consistent for raw returns. From this we
conclude that managers tend to extrapolate raw returns rather than relative performance.
6 Conclusion
We analyze managers' decision to exercise stock options using hazard analysis. This provides us
with the opportunity to explicitly take into account time-varying variables and to take into ac-
count censoring. We distinguish behavioral approaches, utility theory, asymmetric information,
and institutional constraints as the main approaches to explain stock option exercise decisions.
We compare the explanatory power of these theoretical approaches.
Utility theory is based on the notion that managers exercise their options early in order to
diversify their portfolios. We ﬁnd that this approach has very little explanatory power. Utility-
based models predict that managers exercise their options once the stock price crosses above
an exercise boundary, but we ﬁnd that, if anything, the opposite is the case. Also, managers
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with higher non-ﬁrm related wealth exercise their options earlier, not later, whereas managers
of riskier ﬁrms exercise their options later. Finally, if their stock is more correlated with the
stock market index, then managers can hedge the risk of their options better, but in fact these
managers consistently exercise their options earlier rather than later, as utility theory would
predict. We conclude that diversiﬁcation is not a relevant motive for explaining stock option
exercises.
By contrast, several behavioral hypotheses do have signiﬁcant explanatory power. The ex-
ecutives in our sample tend to exercise their options when their stock trades above the 52-week
high, and they postpone exercises when the stock trades below its 52-week low, which we in-
terpret as evidence for reference dependence. There is strong evidence that managers expect
short-term trends to revert, and weak evidence that they expect long-term trends to continue.
However, the managers in our sample seem to recognize situations when stock prices are likely
to be inﬂated by investor sentiment and exercise their options faster when investor sentiment
is high.
There is consistent evidence for asymmetric information and managers seem to use some
information when deciding on exercising their options. However, exercises forecast medium term
stock price developments (one or two quarters) and do not seem to be related to short-term
stock price developments (two weeks). We interpret this as an indication of a more cautious
behavior where manages make sure their exercises cannot be classiﬁed as insider trading. The
economic impact of asymmetric information is small compared to other factors.
Some institutional factors are important. Managers seem to maintain their option portfolios
at some target level and exercise options when new options are granted. Also, managers avoid
blackout periods and move exercises from the time before earnings announcements to the period
immediately after earnings announcements. Vesting restrictions are binding and managers
exercise many options immediately after they vest. Interestingly, dividend capture is not an
important motive and, if anything, managers exercise more options after dividend payments
than before.
We therefore conclude that behavioral and institutional factors have a ﬁrst-order impact and
largely drive option exercise decisions, whereas asymmetric information has a more moderate
role. By contrast, utility theory has no explanatory power.
One limitation of our approach is that we cannot directly investigate the importance of
liquidity shocks, for example when manager make major consumption decisions or when they
leave the ﬁrm. We believe that these factors also have some impact, but we do not have data
that would allow us to investigate them in a large sample.
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An open question is how the factors we analyze so far inﬂuence the valuation of employee
stock options. The literature on ESO valuation has focused on the utility approach and reduced-
form modeling of liquidity shocks. We reject the ﬁrst approach and cannot test the second.
Applying the insights from this paper to ESO valuation is surely a fruitful avenue of investiga-
tion which we leave for future research.
25
References
[1] Armstrong, Christopher S.; Alan D. Jagolinzer, and David F. Larcker, 2007, Timing of
Employee Stock Option Exercises and the Cost of Option Grants, Working Paper, Stanford
University, (June)
[2] Baker, Malcolm, and Jeﬀrey Wurgler, 2006, Investor Sentiment and the Cross-Section of
Stock Returns, Journal of Finance 61, no. 4 (August), pp. 1645-1680
[3] Barone-Adesi, Giovanni, and Robert E. Whaley, 1987, Eﬃcient Analytic Approximation
of American Option Values, Journal of Finance 42, no. 2 (June), pp. 301-320
[4] Becker, Bo, 2006, Wealth, Risk Aversion and CEO Compensation, Journal of Finance 61,
no. 1 (February), pp. 379-397
[5] Bettis, J. Carr; John M. Bizjak, and Michael L. Lemmon, 2001, Managerial ownership, in-
centive contracting, and the use of zero-cost collars and equity swaps by corporate insiders,
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36, pp. 345370.
[6] , 2005, Exercise Behavior, Valuation, and the Incentive Eﬀects of Employee Stock
Options, Journal of Financial Economics 76, pp. 455-470
[7] Bettis, J. Carr; Jeﬀrey L. Coles, and Michael L. Lemmon, 2000, Corporate Policies Re-
stricting Trading by Insiders, Journal of Financial Economics 57, pp. 191-220
[8] Cameron, A. Colin, and Pravin K. Trivedi, 2005, Microeconometrics: Methods and Appli-
cations, Cambridge et. al. (Cambridge University Press)
[9] Carpenter, Jennifer N., 1998, The Exercise and Valuation of Executive Stock Options,
Journal of Financial Economics 48, no. 2 , pp. 127-158
[10] Carpenter, Jennifer N., and Barbara Remmers, 2001, Executive Stock Option Exercises
and Inside Information, Journal of Business 74, no. 4 (October)
[11] Dahiya, Sandeep, and David Yermack, 2007, You Can't Take It With You: Sunset Provi-
sions for Equity Compensation When Managers Retire, Resign, or Die, Working Paper,
New York University, (December)
[12] Detemple, J., and S. Sundaresan, 1999, Nontraded Asset Valuation With Portfolio Con-
straints: a Binomial Approach, Review of Financial Studies 12, no. 4 , pp. 835-72
26
[13] Dittmann, Ingolf, and Ernst. Maug, 2007, Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal
Structure of Executive Pay, Journal of Finance 62, no. 1 (February), pp. 303-343
[14] Hallock, Kevin F., and Craig A. Olson, 2006, The Value of Stock Options to Non-Executive
Employees, NBER Working Paper, no. 11950 (January)
[15] Heath, Chip; Steven Huddart, and Mark Lang, 1999, Psychological Factors and Stock
Option Exercise, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 2 (May), pp. 601-27
[16] Huddart, Steven J., 1994, Employee Stock Options, Journal of Accounting and Economics
18, pp. 207-231
[17] Huddart, Steven J., and Mark Lang, 1996, Employee Stock Option Exercises: An Empirical
Analysis, Journal of Accounting and Economics 21, pp. 5-43
[18] Jennergren, L., and B. Näslund, 1993, A Comment on "Valuation of Executive Stock
Options and the FASB Proposal", Accounting Review 68, pp. 179-183
[19] Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, 1973, On the Psychology of Prediction, Psycholog-
ical Review 80, no. 4 (July), pp. 237-251
[20] Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, 1979, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, Econometrica 47, no. 2 (March), pp. 263-292
[21] Kiefer, Nicholas M., 1988, Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions, Journal of
Economic Literature 26, no. 2 (June), pp. 646-679
[22] Lancaster, Tony, 1990, The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, Cambridge (Cam-
bridge University Press)
[23] Lee, Charles M. C.; Andrei Shleifer, and Richard H. Thaler, 1991, Investor Sentiment and
the Closed-End Fund Puzzle, Journal of Finance 46, no. 1 (March), pp. 75-109
[24] Lemmon, Michael L., and Evgenia Portniaguina, 2008, Consumer Conﬁdence and Asset
Prices: Some Empirical Evidence, Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming
[25] Liu, Crocker H., and David Yermack, 2007,Where Are the Shareholders' Mansions? CEOs'
Home Purchases, Stock Sales, and Subsequent Company Performance, Working Paper,
Arizona State University, (October)
27
[26] Malmendier, Ulrike, and Geoﬀrey Tate, 2005, CEO Overconﬁdence and Corporate Invest-
ment, Journal of Finance 60, no. 6 (December), pp. 2661-2700
[27] Malmendier, Ulrike, and Geoﬀrey Tate, 2005, Does Overconﬁdence Aﬀect Corporate In-
vestment? CEO Overconﬁdence Measures Revisited, European Financial Management 11,
no. 5 (November), pp. 649-659
[28] Marquardt, Carol A., 2002, The Cost of Employee Stock Options Grants: An Empirical
Analysis, Journal of Accounting Research 40, no. 4 (September), pp. pp. 1191-
[29] Mazumdar, Sumon C.; Vikram K. Nanda, and Rahul Surana, 2007, Using Auctions to
Price Employee Stock Options: The Case of Zions Bancorporation ESOARS, Working
Paper, Arizona State University, (August)
[30] Ofek, Eli, and David Yermack, 2000, Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the
Evolution of Managerial Ownership, Journal of Finance 55, no. 3 , pp. 1367-1384
[31] Qiu, Lily Xiaoli, and IvoWelch, 2006, Investor Sentiment Measures,Working Paper, Brown
University, (July)
[32] Royston, Patrick, 2006, Explained variation for survival models, Stata Journal 6, no. 1,
pp. 83-96
[33] Sautner, Zacharias, and Martin Weber, 2006, How Do Managers Behave in Stock Option
Plans? Evidence From Exercise and Survey Data, Working Paper, University of Amster-
dam, (July)
[34] , 2008, What Determines How Top Managers Value Their Stock Options?, Working
Paper, University of Amsterdam, (July)
[35] Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman, 1971, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, Psy-
chological Bulletin 76, no. 2 , pp. 105-110
28
7 Tables
Table 1: Sample design from raw IFDF data to our ﬁnal sample. We report the number of
option packages, the number of exercises, the number of persons, and the number of ﬁrms for derivatives
with non-missing entries for the strike price, vesting date, and expiration date in IFDF. We show losses
of observations after matching the IFDF data with ExecuComp and Datastream. We drop options
that are never in the money or that never become vested. We only consider exercises where at least




IFDF data 1,534,713 204,304 124,766 11,828
Observations lost because of:
Missing compensation data 1,264,340 143,001 107,214 9,381
No stock price information 37,343 7,215 882 74
Options never exerciseable 45,334 21,793 987 47
Final sample 187,696 32,295 15,683 2,326
Table 2: Option characteristics. Information is for the vesting date. The BAW-value is the Barone-
Adesi and Whaley (1987) value for American options. Volatility is the volatility of the return of the
underlying stock for weekly data measured over the 52 weeks before vesting. The interest rate is the
yield of a zero-coupon government bond closest to the maturity of the respective option, where we use
maturities of 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10 years.
Option
packages




BAW-value ($ million) 185,695 0.87 22.42 0.02 0.09 0.35
Time to maturity (years) 187,696 7.52 2.02 6.73 7.98 8.98
Stock price/Strike price 187,183 7.48 537.14 1.01 1.29 1.85
Volatility 185,700 0.44 0.24 0.28 0.39 0.54
Dividend yield (%) 187,696 0.79 1.48 0.00 0.00 1.12
Interest rate (%) 187,696 4.54 0.96 4.01 4.38 5.07
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on exercise strategies. The table reports the importance of
fractional exercise in out sample. It has information on exercise choice if the holder owns at least two
option packages. We report if an option package with a dividend paying underlying is exercised above




Early exercises per package (if exercised) 29,442 1.10 0.32
Fraction exercised early (if exercised) 29,442 0.83 0.26
Exercise option with max. BAW-value/Inner value 30,733 0.36 0.48
Exercise option with min. BAW-value/Inner value 30,733 0.15 0.35
Option exercised above BAW-threshold 13,785 0.18 0.38
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Table 4: Reasons for right censoring. We deﬁne options where the database does not record
exercises before maturity as right censored. We exclude the the week of expiry in the analysis. This
table reports for each possible reason for right censoring the total number of option packages, the
percentage of the total, and the percentage of packages that are in the money (ITM) or out of the
money (OTM) at the right censoring date. A fraction of one and the same option can be censored
while others are non-censored. In such cases we take that censoring reason as representative for the
whole package that applies to its largest fraction.
Censoring reason Number % of total
Expired in the money 12,339 6.6
Expired out of the money 2,109 1.1
Holder left ﬁrm 13,502 7.2
Alive in Jan. 2007 134,936 71.9
No censoring 24,810 13.2
Total 187,696 100.0
Table 5: Key ﬁnancial ﬁrm statistics. For each ﬁrm we average the observations from 1996 to 2006
for all years where at least one option package exists and where we have data. All accounting numbers
are in million dollars. Panel A includes all ﬁrms in our ﬁnal sample, Panel B includes all ﬁrms on
IFDF. We can match only 2,114 of the 2,326 ﬁrms in our sample and only 9,451 of the 11,828 ﬁrms on
IFDF to WorldScope.







Market capitalization 2,105 5,899 19,165 533 1,268 3,971
Book value of assets 2,107 10,078 49,750 423 1,263 4,573
Sales 2,111 3,804 10,552 355 964 2,815
Net Income 2,113 238 961 8 43 156
Employees 2,099 14,348 41,896 1,271 4,025 11,726
Employees with option grants 2,114 5 3 3 5 7
Market to book ratio 2,100 5.1 35 1.7 2.6 4.0
Net income/Sales 2,110 -0.1 2 0.0 0.0 0.1
P/E ratio 2,104 23.3 108 9.1 17.6 26.2







Market capitalization 9,349 1,595 9,472 33 137 596
Book value of assets 9,409 2,743 24,324 35 157 706
Sales 9,421 1,074 5,836 19 80 386
Net Income 9,423 53 478 -6 1 15
Employees 9,308 4,266 21,725 101 375 1,909





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Descriptive statistics on option packages. All variable deﬁnitions are contained in Table
6. The table contains information on all variables in the baseline speciﬁcation. We ﬁrst calculate means
for each option package including all weekly observations where the option package is exerciseable. The
statistics in the table are calculated from these means.
Option
packages





Alpha26 187,696 .18 1.9 .012 .14 .29
Alpha52 187,696 .17 1.2 .027 .14 .28
Alpha156 187,696 .17 .45 .05 .15 .25
CCI 187,696 104 11 99 102 106
MaxPrice 187,696 .16 .18 .055 .13 .2
MinPrice 187,696 .023 .057 0 0 .028
Utility
Correlation 187,696 .42 .15 .33 .43 .52
FirmSecuritiesj 187,696 16 1.8 15 16 17
Moneyness 187,696 8.4 411 1.2 1.6 2.3
Moneyness2 187,696 2.2e+03 2.6e+05 .015 .025 .055
OtherCompensation 187,696 6.2 1.4 5.8 6.3 6.9
V alueThisGrant 187,696 12 2.2 10 12 13
V olatility 187,696 .38 1.3 .25 .34 .45
Institutional
Dividend 187,696 4.4e-03 .02 0 0 0
BAWBound 187,696 2.3e-05 8.4e-04 0 0 0
DividendY ield 187,696 .76 1.3 0 0 1.1
EarnAnnounceAfter 187,696 .018 .05 0 0 0
EarnAnnounceBefore 187,696 5.8e-03 .018 0 0 0
GrantWeekAfter 187,696 .04 .096 0 .02 .045
GrantWeekBefore 187,696 .016 .037 0 6.6e-03 .02
V estingWeek 187,696 .065 .17 0 .016 .043
Asymmetric Information
CAR2 187,696 -.01 .075 -.013 -4.4e-03 -3.5e-04
CAR13 187,696 -.06 .35 -.082 -.029 -3.4e-03
CAR26 187,696 -.11 .63 -.16 -.061 -7.9e-03
Other
CEO 187,696 .15 .36 0 0 0
InnerV alue 187,696 .6 .28 .38 .64 .83
Maturity 187,696 5.6 2.1 4.5 6 7
Maturity4WeeksBefore 187,696 3.7e-03 .043 0 0 0
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Table 8: Hazard rates (hri = exp {βi}−1, where βi is the respective coeﬃcient) for hazard regressions
on ten equally sized random samples (option packages not split up). The dependent variable is Exercise,
which equals one if the fraction exercised equals at least 25% of the option package initially granted. In
addition to the independent variables shown we included dummy variables for calendar years, vesting
years, and seasonal eﬀects.
1 2 3 4 5
Behavioral
Alpha26 1.43 *** 0.19 *** 0.20 *** 0.20 *** 0.20 ***
Alpha52 0.26 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
Alpha156 -0.07 -0.06 * -0.06 -0.00 -0.07 **
CCI 0.15 *** 0.09 * 0.07 0.15 *** 0.12 **
MaxPrice 0.67 *** 0.67 *** 0.67 *** 0.70 *** 0.67 ***
MinPrice -0.35 * -0.40 ** -0.39 ** -0.06 -0.47 **
Utility
Correlation 0.10 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.12 *** 0.11 ***
FirmSecuritiesj -0.06 * -0.07 ** -0.04 -0.07 ** -0.05
Moneyness -0.05 -0.03 ** -0.01 -0.05 -0.08
Moneyness2 0.02 0.03 *** 0.01 -0.12 0.04 **
OtherCompensation 0.03 0.05 ** 0.05 ** 0.03 0.07 ***
V alueThisGrant -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 ** -0.03 -0.07 **
V olatility -0.77 *** -0.08 ** -0.09 *** -0.09 *** -0.07 **
Institutional
Dividend -0.50 ** -0.48 * -0.16 -0.05 -0.00
BAWBound -1.00 *** -1.00 *** 2.15 -1.00 *** 1.42
DividendY ield -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01
EarnAnnounceAfter 0.86 *** 1.05 *** 0.91 *** 0.78 *** 0.86 ***
EarnAnnounceBefore -0.49 -0.70 ** -0.72 ** -0.76 ** -0.68 **
GrantWeekAfter 3.62 *** 4.52 *** 3.99 *** 4.43 *** 3.90 ***
GrantWeekBefore -0.20 0.03 -0.14 0.05 -0.18
V estingWeek 9.04 *** 8.99 *** 8.91 *** 9.02 *** 11.32 ***
Asymmetric Information
CAR2 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 **
CAR13 -0.23 *** -0.06 ** -0.04 -0.09 *** -0.05
CAR26 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 ** -0.01 -0.08 **
Other
CEO -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 * -0.13 ** -0.08
InnerV alue 0.88 *** 0.99 *** 0.95 *** 0.89 *** 1.01 ***
Maturity -0.28 *** -0.26 *** -0.23 *** -0.25 *** -0.25 ***
Maturity4WeeksBefore 3.58 *** 5.17 *** 5.22 *** 4.34 *** 4.09 ***
Constant -1.00 *** -1.00 *** -1.00 *** -1.00 *** -1.00 ***
ln(p) 0.10 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.12 *** 0.12 ***
R2 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.76
34
6 7 8 9 10
Behavioral
Alpha26 0.25 *** 0.21 *** 0.24 *** 0.21 *** 0.29 ***
Alpha52 -0.04 0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.04
Alpha156 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 *
CCI 0.16 *** 0.13 ** 0.12 ** 0.18 *** 0.10 *
MaxPrice 0.72 *** 0.45 *** 0.74 *** 0.64 *** 0.54 ***
MinPrice -0.16 -0.36 * -0.27 -0.18 -0.45 **
Utility
Correlation 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.13 *** 0.09 *** 0.13 ***
FirmSecuritiesj -0.04 -0.05 * -0.04 -0.06 ** -0.07 **
Moneyness -0.02 -0.60 -0.05 -0.14 *** 0.08
Moneyness2 0.01 0.70 0.04 0.10 *** -0.33
OtherCompensation 0.05 ** 0.05 ** 0.03 0.10 *** 0.08 ***
V alueThisGrant -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 **
V olatility -0.09 *** -0.12 *** -0.08 ** -0.13 *** -0.06 **
Institutional
Dividend 0.10 -0.31 -0.40 * -0.30 0.05
BAWBound -1.00 *** 5.69 * 6.27 *** -1.00 *** 1.77
DividendY ield 0.06 * 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.02
EarnAnnounceAfter 1.07 *** 0.74 *** 0.87 *** 0.76 *** 0.34 **
EarnAnnounceBefore -0.41 -0.74 *** -0.60 * -0.63 ** -0.52 *
GrantWeekAfter 4.05 *** 4.03 *** 4.26 *** 4.02 *** 4.23 ***
GrantWeekBefore -0.17 0.06 0.07 -0.16 -0.22
V estingWeek 9.64 *** 9.74 *** 13.01 *** 8.55 *** 10.03 ***
Asymmetric Information
CAR2 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.00
CAR13 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.01
CAR26 -0.08 ** -0.07 * -0.08 ** -0.02 -0.13 ***
Other
CEO -0.09 * -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.13 **
InnerV alue 0.89 *** 0.91 *** 0.96 *** 1.01 *** 0.97 ***
Maturity -0.26 *** -0.26 *** -0.27 *** -0.23 *** -0.26 ***
Maturity4WeeksBefore 5.15 *** 4.82 *** 3.15 *** 5.20 *** 3.19 ***
Constant -1.00 *** -1.00 *** -1.00 *** -1.00 *** -1.00 ***
ln(p) 0.11 *** 0.13 *** 0.17 *** 0.11 *** 0.12 ***
R2 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.76
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Table 9: Summary for hazard regressions. Exercise=1 if fraction exercised is at least 25%.
This table summarizes the results of Table 8. We report the mean hazard rate (hri = exp {βi} − 1,)
across all ten subsamples, the coeﬃcient of variation of the hazard rate ( sd(hri)mean(hri)), the aggregated
t-value, the number of positive/negative coeﬃcients, and the number of positive/negative coeﬃcients
that are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
mean
hr








Alpha26 0.34 0.58 26.64 10 0 10 0
Alpha52 0.05 0.09 3.95 8 2 0 0
Alpha156 -0.04 0.03 -6.45 1 9 0 1
CCI 0.13 0.04 14.80 10 0 7 0
MaxPrice 0.65 0.25 44.05 10 0 10 0
MinPrice -0.31 0.10 -2.45 0 10 0 4
Utility
Correlation 0.11 0.02 40.38 10 0 10 0
FirmSecuritiesj -0.05 0.01 -17.30 0 10 0 4
Moneyness -0.10 0.17 -0.31 1 9 0 2
Moneyness2 0.05 0.27 0.07 8 2 3 0
OtherCompensation 0.05 0.02 31.81 10 0 7 0
V alueThisGrant -0.05 0.02 -12.78 0 10 0 3
V olatility -0.16 0.19 -21.72 0 10 0 10
Institutional
Dividend -0.21 0.18 -0.92 2 8 0 1
BAWBound 1.23 12.27 -2.92 5 5 1 5
DividendY ield 0.01 0.03 4.44 8 2 0 0
EarnAnnounceAfter 0.82 1.15 9.32 10 0 10 0
EarnAnnounceBefore -0.63 0.07 -1.18 0 10 0 6
GrantWeekAfter 4.10 0.08 33.25 10 0 10 0
GrantWeekBefore -0.09 0.11 -1.00 4 6 0 0
V estingWeek 9.83 0.16 26.30 10 0 10 0
Asymmetric Information
CAR2 -0.01 0.02 -7.85 2 8 0 1
CAR13 -0.07 0.06 -12.13 1 9 0 3
CAR26 -0.06 0.04 -8.46 1 9 0 5
Other
CEO -0.08 0.04 -6.53 0 10 0 2
InnerV alue 0.95 0.95 126.60 10 0 10 0
Maturity -0.26 0.01 -83.18 0 10 0 10
Maturity4WeeksBefore 4.39 0.25 21.53 10 0 10 0
Constant -1.00 0.00 -36.94 0 10 0 10
ln(p) 0.12 0.02 46.67 10 0 10 0
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Table 10: Summary for hazard regressions. Exercise=1 if fraction exercised is at least
10%. We report the mean hazard rate (hri = exp {βi} − 1,), the coeﬃcient of variation of the hazard
rate ( sd(hri)mean(hri)), the aggregated t-value, the number of positive/negative coeﬃcients, and the number
of positive/negative coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant to the 5% level.
mean
hr








Alpha26 0.30 0.44 27.53 10 0 10 0
Alpha52 0.05 0.08 4.60 8 2 0 0
Alpha156 -0.02 0.03 -4.76 2 8 0 1
CCI 0.10 0.04 13.56 10 0 7 0
MaxPrice 0.63 0.19 50.09 10 0 10 0
MinPrice -0.33 0.11 -2.99 0 10 0 7
Utility
Correlation 0.10 0.02 39.96 10 0 10 0
FirmSecuritiesj -0.07 0.01 -27.86 0 10 0 10
Moneyness -0.09 0.19 -0.32 2 8 0 2
Moneyness2 0.07 0.32 0.21 8 2 3 0
OtherCompensation 0.05 0.02 29.18 10 0 5 0
V alueThisGrant 0.05 0.02 13.00 10 0 2 0
V olatility -0.14 0.19 -22.01 0 10 0 8
Institutional
Dividend -0.19 0.21 -1.05 3 7 0 1
BAWBound 1.17 13.30 -1.84 6 4 1 4
DividendY ield -0.00 0.02 -0.19 5 5 0 0
EarnAnnounceAfter 0.86 1.26 11.38 10 0 10 0
EarnAnnounceBefore -0.64 0.05 -1.49 0 10 0 8
GrantWeekAfter 3.77 0.08 33.16 10 0 10 0
GrantWeekBefore -0.09 0.10 -1.19 3 7 0 0
V estingWeek 9.93 0.14 28.47 10 0 10 0
Asymmetric Information
CAR2 -0.01 0.02 -7.71 1 9 0 1
CAR13 -0.06 0.06 -13.75 1 9 0 3
CAR26 -0.06 0.04 -9.20 1 9 0 3
Other
CEO -0.06 0.05 -4.88 1 9 0 2
InnerV alue 0.96 1.27 138.96 10 0 10 0
Maturity -0.23 0.01 -68.48 0 10 0 10
Maturity4WeeksBefore 4.35 0.26 22.83 10 0 10 0
Constant -1.00 0.00 -37.44 0 10 0 10
ln(p) 0.13 0.02 51.90 10 0 10 0
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Table 11: Summary for hazard regressions. Exercise=1 if fraction exercised is at least
50%. We report the mean hazard rate (hri = exp {βi} − 1,), the coeﬃcient of variation of the hazard
rate ( sd(hri)mean(hri)), the aggregated t-value, the number of positive/negative coeﬃcients, and the number
of positive/negative coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant to the 5% level.
mean
hr








Alpha26 0.37 0.78 21.59 10 0 10 0
Alpha52 0.06 0.08 4.09 8 2 1 0
Alpha156 -0.05 0.04 -6.81 1 9 0 2
CCI 0.16 0.04 14.60 10 0 8 0
MaxPrice 0.64 0.26 34.77 10 0 10 0
MinPrice -0.30 0.11 -1.91 0 10 0 3
Utility
Correlation 0.12 0.02 36.21 10 0 10 0
FirmSecuritiesj -0.01 0.02 -3.05 2 8 0 0
Moneyness 0.04 0.33 0.01 5 5 1 2
Moneyness2 -0.14 0.31 -0.53 4 6 3 1
OtherCompensation 0.07 0.03 30.58 10 0 7 0
V alueThisGrant -0.14 0.02 -41.27 0 10 0 10
V olatility -0.16 0.19 -19.87 0 10 0 9
Institutional
Dividend -0.21 0.22 -0.74 3 7 0 0
BAWBound 1.58 7.00 -3.88 4 6 1 6
DividendY ield 0.02 0.03 7.92 8 2 1 0
EarnAnnounceAfter 0.80 0.95 7.39 10 0 9 0
EarnAnnounceBefore -0.63 0.09 -0.84 0 10 0 2
GrantWeekAfter 4.37 0.08 31.04 10 0 10 0
GrantWeekBefore -0.06 0.13 -0.63 4 6 0 0
V estingWeek 10.15 0.16 23.22 10 0 10 0
Asymmetric Information
CAR2 -0.02 0.03 -7.81 2 8 0 1
CAR13 -0.07 0.05 -10.76 1 9 0 4
CAR26 -0.05 0.04 -6.70 1 9 0 2
Other
CEO -0.07 0.04 -5.20 1 9 0 0
InnerV alue 0.93 0.79 102.13 10 0 10 0
Maturity -0.30 0.01 -91.61 0 10 0 10
Maturity4WeeksBefore 4.33 0.29 18.47 10 0 10 0
Constant -1.00 0.00 -32.81 0 10 0 10
ln(p) 0.11 0.02 38.01 10 0 10 0
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Table 12: Summary for hazard regressions for subsample where stock is sold. We report the
mean hazard rate (hri = exp {βi} − 1,), the coeﬃcient of variation of the hazard rate ( sd(hri)mean(hri)), the
aggregated t-value, the number of positive/negative coeﬃcients, and the number of positive/negative
coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant to the 5% level.




pos. sig. neg. sig
CEO -0.13 0.06 -9.26 0 10 0 6
Correlation 0.12 0.02 36.45 10 0 10 0
FirmSecuritiesj -0.04 0.01 -10.86 0 10 0 0
OtherCompensation 0.06 0.03 28.00 10 0 6 0
V alueThisGrant -0.00 0.03 -1.06 5 5 0 0
V olatility -0.21 0.18 -22.48 0 10 0 10
CAR2 -0.02 0.02 -10.91 1 9 0 1
Table 13: Summary for hazard regressions with raw returns. We report the mean hazard rate
(hri = exp {βi}− 1,), the coeﬃcient of variation of the hazard rate ( sd(hri)mean(hri)), the aggregated t-value,
the number of positive/negative coeﬃcients, and the number of positive/negative coeﬃcients that are
signiﬁcant to the 5% level.




pos. sig. neg. sig
Behavioral
Return26 0.12 0.03 115.83 10 0 10 0
Return52 -0.03 0.02 -25.47 1 9 0 4
Return156 -0.01 0.01 -6.90 3 7 0 0
CCI 0.13 0.04 15.16 10 0 7 0
MaxPrice 0.70 0.35 45.68 10 0 10 0
MinPrice -0.42 0.08 -3.45 0 10 0 7
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